Article
Care
Comment
5 min read

The healing touch in an era of personalised medicine

As data powers a revolution in personalised medicine, surgeon David Cranston asks if we are risk of dehumanising medicine?

David Cranston is emeritus Professor of Surgery at Oxford University. As well as publishing academically, he has has also authored books on John Radcliffe, and mentoring.

A doctor looks thoughtful will holding a stethoscope to their ears.
Photo by Nappy on Unsplash.

In 1877 Arthur Conan Doyle was sitting in one of Dr Joseph Bell’s outpatient clinics in Edinburgh as a medical student, when a lady came in with a child, carrying a small coat. Dr Bell asked her how the crossing of the Firth of Forth had been on the ferry that morning. Looking sightly askance she replied;  

 “Fine thank you sir.”  

 He then went on to ask what she had done with her younger child who came with her.  

Looking more astonished she said:   

“I left him with my aunt who lives in Edinburgh.   

Bell goes on to ask if she walked through the Botanic Gardens on the way to his clinic and if she still worked in the Linoleum factory and to both these questions she answered in the affirmative.  

Turning to the students he explained  

“I could tell from her accent that she came from across the Firth of Forth and the only way across is by the ferry. You noticed that she was carrying a coat which was obviously too small for the child she had with her, which suggested she had another younger child and had left him somewhere. The only place when you see the red mud that she has on her boots is in the Botanic Gardens  and the skin rash on her hands is typical of workers in the  Linoleum factory.   

It was this study of the diagnostic methods of Dr Joseph Bell led Conan Doyle to create the character of Sherlock Holmes.  

A hundred years later and I was young doctor. In 1977 there were no CT or MRI scanners. We were taught the importance of taking a detailed history and examination. Including the social history. We would recognise the RAF tie and the silver (silk producing) caterpillar badge on the lapel of a patient jacket.  We would ask him when he joined the caterpillar club and how many times he had had to bail out of his plane when he was shot down during the war – a life saved by a silk parachute. We would notice the North Devon accent in a lady and ask when she moved to Oxford.  

The patient’s history gave 70% of the diagnosis, examination another 20% and investigation the final 10%. Patients came with symptoms and the doctor made a presumptive diagnosis – often correct - which was confirmed by the investigations. Screening for disease in patients with no symptoms was in its infancy and diseases were diagnosed by talking to the patients and eliciting a clear history and doing a meticulous examination. No longer is that the case.     

At the close of my career, as a renal cancer surgeon, most people came in with a diagnosis already made on the basis of a CT scan, and often small kidney cancers were picked up incidentally with no symptoms. The time spent talking to patients was reduced. On one hand it means more patients can be seen but on the other the personal contact and empathy can be lost.  

Patients lying in in bed have sometimes been ignored. The consultant and the team standing around the foot of the patient’s bed discussing their cases amongst themselves. Or, once off the ward, speaking of the thyroid cancer in bed three or the colon cancer in bed two. Yet patients are people too with histories behind them and woe betide the medic, or indeed the government, who forgets that.  

With computer aided diagnosis, electronic patient records and more sophisticated investigation the patient can easily become even more remote. An object rather than a person.  

We speak today of more personalised medicine with every person having tailored treatment of the basis of whole genome sequencing and knowing each individual’s make up. But we need to be sure that this does not lead to less personalised medicine by forgetting the whole person, body mind and spirit.  

Post Covid, more consultations are done online or over the telephone -often with a doctor you do not know and have never met. Technology has tended to increase the distance between the doctor and patient. The mechanisation of scientific medicine is here to stay, but the patient may well feel that the doctor is more interested in her disease than in herself as a person. History taking and examination is less important in terms of diagnosis and remote medicine means that personal contact including examination and touch are removed.  

Touching has always been an important part of healing. Sir Peter Medawar, who won the Nobel prize for medicine sums it up well. He asks:  

‘What did doctors do with those many infections whose progress was rapid and whose outcome was usually lethal?   

He replies:  

'For one thing, they practised a little magic, dancing around the bedside, making smoke, chanting incomprehensibilities and touching the patient everywhere.? This touching was the real professional secret, never acknowledged as the central essential skill.'

Touch has been rated as the oldest and most effective act of healing.   

Touch can reduce pain, anxiety, and depression, and there are occasions when one can communicate far more through touch than in words, for there are times when no words are good enough or holy enough to minister to someone’s pain.   

Yet today touching any patient without clear permission can make people ill at ease and mistrustful and risk justified accusation. It is a tightrope many have to walk very carefully. In an age of whole-person care it is imperative that the right balance be struck. There’s an ancient story that illustrates the power of that human connection in the healing process. 

When a leper approached Jesus in desperation, Jesus did not simply offer a healing word from safe distance. he stretched out his hand and touched him. He felt deeply for lepers cut off from all human contact. He touched the untouchables.   

William Osler a Canadian physician who was one of the founding fathers of the Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, and ended up as Regius Professor of Medicine in Oxford,  said:  

“It is more important to know about the patient who has the disease than the disease that has the patient”.  

For all the advantages modern medicine has to offer, it is vital to find ways to retain that personal element of medicine. Patients are people too. 

Article
Assisted dying
Comment
Justice
5 min read

Will clinicians and carers objecting to assisted death be treated as nuisances?

The risk and mental cost of forcing someone to act against their conscience.
A tired-looking doctor sits at a desk dealing with paperwork.
Francisco Venâncio on Unsplash.

After a formal introduction to the House of Commons next Wednesday, MP’s will debate a draft Bill to change UK legislation on Assisted Dying. Previously, a draft Bill was introduced in the Scottish Parliament in March 2024, and is currently at committee stage. Meanwhile, in the House of Lords, a Private Member’s Bill was introduced by Lord Falconer in July and currently awaits its second reading. These draft Bills, though likely to be dropped and superseded by the Commons Bill in the fullness of time, give an early indication of what provision might be made on behalf of clinicians and other healthcare workers who wish to recuse themselves from carrying out a patient’s end of life wishes on grounds of Conscientious Objection.  

There are various reasons why someone might want to conscientiously object. The most commonly cited are faith or religious commitments. This is not to say that all people of faith are against a change in the law – there are some high-profile religious advocates for the legalisation of Assisted Dying, including both Rabbi Dr Jonathan Romain and Lord Carey, the former Archbishop of Canterbury. Even so, there will be many adherents to various faith traditions who find themselves unable to take part in hastening the end of someone’s life because they feel it conflicts with their views on God and what it means to be human. 

However, there are also Conscientious Objectors who are not religious, or not formally so. Some people, perhaps many, simply feel unsure of the rights and wrongs of the matter. The coming debates will no doubt feature discussion of how changing the law for those who are terminally ill in the Netherlands and Canada has to lead to subsequent changes in the law to include those who are not terminally, but instead chronically ill. The widening of the eligibility criteria has reached a point where, in the Netherlands, one in every 20 people now ends their life by euthanasia. This troubling statistic includes many who are neurodivergent, who suffer from depression or are disabled. It is reasonable that, even if a Conscientious Objector does not adhere to a particular religion, they can be allowed to object if they feel uneasy about the social message that Assisted Dying seems to send to vulnerable people.  

“You will often find that legislation that provides a right to conscientious objection is interpreted by judges these days in a way that seems to treat conscientious objectors as nuisances” 

Mehmet Ciftci

  Conscientious Objection clauses can themselves send a social message. A response to the Scottish Bill produced by the Law Society of Scotland notes concern over the wording of the Conscientious Objection clause, as it appears to be more prescriptive in the draft Bill than in previous Acts such as the Abortion Act of 1967. In the case of any legal proceedings that arise from a clinician’s refusal to cooperate, the current wording places the burden of proof onto the Conscientious Objector, stating (at 18.2):  

In any legal proceedings the burden of proof of conscientious objection is to rest on the person claiming to rely on it.  

The Bill provides no indication of what is admissible as ‘proof’. Evidence of membership of a Church, Synagogue, Mosque or similar might be the obvious starting point. But where does that leave those described above, who object on grounds of personal conscience alone? How does one meaningfully evidence an inner sense of unease?  

The wording of the Private Member’s Bill, currently awaiting its second reading in the House of Lords, provides even less clarity, stating only (at 5.0): 

A person is not under any duty (whether by contract or arising from any statutory or other legal requirement) to participate in anything authorised by  this Act to which that person has a conscientious objection. 

Whilst this indicates that there is no duty to participate in assisting someone to end their life, there remains a wider duty of care that healthcare professionals cannot ignore. Thus, a general feature in the interpretation of such conscience clauses in medicine is that that the conscientious objector is under an obligation to refer the case to a professional who does not share the same objection. This can be seen in practice looking at abortion law, where ideas around conscientious objection are more developed and have been tried in the courts. In the case of an abortion, a clinician can refuse to take part in the procedure, but they must still find an alternative clinician who is willing to perform their role, and they must still carry out ancillary care and related administrative tasks.  

Placing such obligations onto clinicians could be seen as diminishing rather than respecting their objection. Dr Mehmet Ciftci, a Researcher at the McDonald Centre for Theology, Ethics and Public Life at the University of Oxford comments:  

You will often find that legislation that provides a right to conscientious objection is interpreted by judges these days in a way that seems to treat conscientious objectors as nuisances who are just preventing the efficient delivery of services. They are forced to refer patients on to those who will perform whatever procedure they are objecting to, which involves a certain cooperation or facilitation with the act. 

This touches everyone, even those who (if the Bill becomes law) will still choose to conscientiously object. Therefore, it is important to consider that the human conscience is a very real phenomenon, which means that facilitating an act that feels morally wrong can give rise to feelings of guilt or shame, even if one has not been a direct participant.  

Psychologists observe that when feelings of guilt are not addressed, if they are treated dismissively or internalised, this can significantly erode self-confidence and increase the likelihood of depressive symptoms. But even before modern psychology could speak to the effects of guilt, biblical writers already had much to say on the painful consequences of living with a troubled conscience. In the Psalms, more than one ancient poet pours out their heart to God, saying that living with guilt has caused their bones to feel weak, or their heart to feel heavy, or their world to feel desolate and lonely.   

If the Conscientious Objection clauses of the new Bill being proposed on Wednesday are not significantly more robust than those in the draft Bills proposed thus far, then perhaps that is something to which we should all conscientiously object? There is much to discuss about the potential rights and wrongs of legalising Assisted Dying, but there is much to discuss about the rights and wrongs of forcing people to act against their consciences too.